Consistency is not the highest epistemic virtue.
Because a thinker may have two clumps of consistent beliefs each of which captures an aspect of reality. He or she could broom one of these clumps of beliefs and achieve greater consistency but at a loss of whatever the other beliefs were accomplishing.
a)viewing the world as a network of causes versus belief in rational agency
b)viewing world as nature vs. viewing it as a meaningful production (the Greek Hebrew mash-up)
c)Confucianism vs. Taoism
They are always easier to see in somebody else than in ourselves.
Why would we give up consistency? For other epistemic virtues — depth maybe or success.
It seems like there has to be some sort of executive intellectual virtue that let’s us know when consistency is important and when it isn’t. Would that have to be consistent? I don’t see why it would.
A related issue: is the inconceivable conceivable? Well, there is a concept “conceivable”. So it seems like we can somehow grasp what inconceivable means. Does that mean there is a higher order set of things which are not concepts — modes of coping maybe, or paths through the forest of being?
Maybe. Maybe not.